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  Since the 1970s, policymakers have relied on test-based accountability (TBA) as 
a primary tool for improving student achievement and reducing racial and socioeconomic 
achievement gaps. These policies have produced striking gains in scores on some 
accountability tests and, in some cases, seeming evidence of narrowing achievement 
gaps.  As a result, support for test-based accountability has been widespread. Most 
policymakers are confident that score gains signify commensurate increases in 
achievement and will translate into improvements in children’s long-term life chances, 
particularly for poor and minority children.  
  However, more than two decades of research indicates that TBA policies have not 
been the unqualified success that gains on high-stakes tests might suggest and have led to 
a variety of undesirable side effects. A recent National Research Council review 
concluded that the effects of TBA programs have ranged from zero to small (National 
Research Council, 2011). In addition, studies have identified distortions of educational 
practice, such as reducing instructional time allocated to material not emphasized on state 
tests (e.g., Koretz, Barron, Mitchell, & Stecher, 1996; Koretz, Mitchell, Barron, & Keith, 
1996; Stecher, 2002; Stecher et al. 2000) in order to focus instruction on material that is 
predictably emphasized on the test. These practices can lead to score inflation- that is, 
gains in scores on the tests used for accountability that are markedly larger than the actual 
gains in student learning they are intended to signal (Koretz and Hamilton, 2006). 
Numerous studies have found that score gains on high-stakes tests often do not generalize 
to lower-stakes assessments used as audit tests, such as the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) (e.g., Center on Education Policy, 2008; Fuller et al., 2006; 
Jacob, 2007; Klein et al., 2000; Koretz & Barron, 1998; Koretz, Linn, Dunbar & Shepard, PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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1991; Lee, 2007). Although score inflation is highly variable across states (Ho, 2007), it 
is often severe. Some studies also have found that TBA programs can generate illusory 
improvements in equity (Klein et al., 2000). 
  Score inflation has at least four important consequences. First, when scores are 
inflated, students have learned less than their scores suggest. Second, because schools 
serving poor and minority students face the most pressure to quickly increase test scores 
and greater barriers to doing so, inflation may affect them more severely, with negative 
implications for educational equity. Third, because inflation varies across schools, 
relative improvements become difficult to evaluate, and researchers and policymakers 
will misidentify effective and ineffective schools and teachers. Finally, accurate data on 
how students are performing is necessary for policymakers to identify and implement 
interventions that improve students’ long-term outcomes. In the absence of such data, we 
may pursue interventions that are not effective or fail to implement policies that could 
improve student achievement. 
  To date, few studies have attempted to understand the sources of variation in 
score inflation across testing programs. In particular, research has not identified the 
specific characteristics of tests that facilitate or impede score inflation and inappropriate 
test preparation, that is, test preparation that inflates scores. Without this information, it is 
impossible to improve existing assessments to lessen these problems.  
  This chapter is the first attempt in the literature to systematically investigate the 
opportunities for score inflation within current tests. We evaluate released items from the 
mathematics tests of two states, Massachusetts and New York, in the years 2006-2008, to 
identify predictable recurrences that provide opportunities for narrowed instruction that PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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might inflate scores. In this paper, we focus primarily on the 8
th-grade tests in both states 
and the 10
th-grade test in Massachusetts, but we also draw selectively from other grades 
for purposes of illustration. We selected Massachusetts and New York because they 
provide a strong contrast. The New York and Massachusetts content standards are very 
different; New York’s are much narrower than those of Massachusetts, sometimes 
specifying a single fact or skill. At least through 2005, NAEP trends did not suggest 
inflation of Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) math scores in 
grades 4 or 8 (Ho, 2007), although no audit studies have been conducted with the higher-
stakes tenth-grade MCAS test that is our focus. In contrast, New York State’s eighth-
grade math scores increased far more rapidly than its NAEP scores did after 2010. Both 
the Massachusetts MCAS tests and the state’s reforms are generally well-regarded in the 
policy community. For example, Diane Ravitch asserted that “Massachusetts… has 
earned its high marks the old-fashioned way, by improving its curriculum, testing 
incoming teachers, and sponsoring assessments far superior to those in most other states” 
(Ravitch, 2010). On the other hand, New York’s testing program has been the focus of 
considerable controversy in the press and policy community. Unlike policymakers in 
many states, then-Commissioner David Steiner acknowledged in 2010 the likelihood of 
inflation in the state’s test scores, and the New York State Department of Education has 
since that time pursued a policy of making its tests broader and less predictable in order 
to combat inflation. 
Previous Research 
  The research literature on responses to high-stakes testing falls into three 
categories: 1) studies of the manipulation of the tested population, 2) studies of score PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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inflation, and 3) investigations of changes in instructional strategies—including test 
preparation—and other aspects of practice. 
  The first category of studies, primarily in economics and sociology, examines 
strategies to remove students from the tested population in order to raise aggregate 
scores. For example, one study found that when schools are permitted to exclude special 
education students from testing, they assign more students to special education (Figlio & 
Getlzer, 2006). Other studies have found increased exclusion of low-scoring students 
(e.g., Jacob, 2005; Jennings & Beveridge, 2009). Although such strategies can create a 
modest bias in aggregate scores, they do not inflate the scores of individual students. 
Moreover, they are unrelated to the content of the specific tests. Therefore, they are not 
pertinent to the present study. 
  Studies in the second category (score inflation) follow a common logic. 
Achievement tests are small samples drawn from large domains such as “eighth grade 
mathematics” that are the target of users’ inferences. The inference about mastery of the 
large domain based on scores is only valid to the extent that one can generalize from the 
small, tested sample to mastery of the largely untested domain. If score gains do signify 
increased mastery of the larger domain, reasonably similar gains should appear in other 
samples from that domain—that is, in scores on other tests intended to support similar 
inferences about achievement. Therefore, most studies of score inflation have 
investigated the extent to which gains in scores on a high-stakes test generalize to trends 
on a lower-stakes audit test. 
  The first empirical investigation of inflation was conducted by Koretz, Linn, 
Dunbar, and Shepard (1991) in a district with a testing policy that was high-stakes by the PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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standards of the day, but much lower-stakes than the norm today. The district 
administration pressured schools and teachers to improve scores, but there were no 
concrete sanctions or rewards for scores. When the district replaced one commercial, 
multiple-choice, basic skills achievement test battery with a quite similar competitor, 
math scores at the end of third grade dropped by half an academic year. Four years later, 
scores on the new test had reached the level that had been reached on the old test in its 
final year of use. This “sawtooth” pattern accompanying the adoption of new tests had 
been widely recognized in the psychometric community, but no prior studies examined 
whether the skills assessed by the earlier test remained stable or atrophied after the 
introduction of the new test. Koretz et al. administered the test that the district had 
abandoned four years earlier to a random sample of classrooms. Scores on that test had 
dropped by half an academic year while scores on the new test had risen by a like 
amount. Another random sample of classrooms was administered a parallel form of the 
new test (that is, a form designed to be equivalent) to evaluate whether performance on 
the researchers’ tests were depressed by motivational factors. No motivational bias was 
found. 
  Since then, a substantial number of studies have followed the same approach, but 
using audit tests that were already in place rather than administering an alternative test 
experimentally. The most commonly used audit test has been NAEP. NAEP represents a 
degree of national consensus about what students should know, and scores are unlikely to 
be inflated because teachers have no incentive to prepare students specifically for it.  
  Because of a widespread belief in the policy community that the multiple choice 
format was responsible for inflation, Koretz & Barron (1998) evaluated score inflation in PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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Kentucky’s KIRIS high-stakes assessment program, which deemphasized the multiple-
choice format in some years and avoided it entirely in others. They found that gains on 
the KIRIS tests in mathematics in grades 4 and 8 were three to four times as large as the 
state’s gain on NAEP. Hambleton et al. (1995) examined performance gains in fourth 
grade reading in the same KIRIS assessment and found that scores on the state 
assessment increased by .76 of a standard deviation in the space of only two years—an 
extraordinarily rapid increase by historical standards (see Koretz, 1986)—while scores on 
the NAEP reading assessment did not increase at all.  
  Klein et al.’s (2000) study of Texas’ state test and NAEP trends found a disparity 
in trends between the state’s TAAS test and NAEP that was similar in magnitude to that 
found in Kentucky by Koretz & Barron (1998). In addition, they found that the widely 
cited “Texas miracle” of a rapidly shrinking gap between minority and non-Hispanic 
white students was not reflected in NAEP data. Similarly, Jacob (2005) analyzed data 
from the Chicago Public Schools’ Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS), which at that time 
was high-stakes and used for student promotion decisions as well as school 
accountability, and the low-stakes Illinois Goals Assessment Program (IGAP). He found 
large gains on the high-stakes ITBS following the introduction of accountability, but no 
similar effects of the accountability system on the IGAP.  
  A number of other studies that compared trends across numerous states found that 
state test gains typically outpace national test gains, often by a large magnitude (Center 
on Education Policy, 2008; Fuller, 2006; Carnoy and Loeb, 2002; Hanushek and 
Raymond, 2004, 2005; Jacob, 2005, 2007; Grissmer and Flanagan, 1998, Rouse et al PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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2007). These disparities in trends are not uniform, however, and if NAEP is used as a 
comparison, some states appear to have escaped serious inflation (Ho, 2007).  
  The third category of studies examined a variety of behavioral responses to high-
stakes testing that have the potential to inflate scores, including the use of explicit test 
preparation, other instructional strategies, changes in school management, and 
inappropriate testing practices. We are concerned here with test preparation and other 
instructional responses. Following the terminology introduced by Koretz and colleagues 
(Koretz et al., 2001; Koretz & Hamilton, 2006), we distinguish between three types of 
responses that can inflate scores: cheating, reallocation, and coaching. Cheating 
obviously inflates scores and is therefore not a focus of this study.  
  Reallocation refers to redistributing instructional resources, including 
instructional time, to better align with the content of the test. Reallocation is not 
necessarily undesirable. Indeed, one of the aims of TBA is to encourage teachers and 
students to align their activities with standards, that is, to focus more on material that has 
been deemed important and is therefore tested. However, reallocation (and alignment, 
which is a form of reallocation) can inflate scores, if it entails reducing the resources 
directed to portions of the domain that are important for the inferences based on scores 
but that are omitted from or given little emphasis in the test.  Doing so makes 
performance on the tested sample unrepresentative of mastery of the domain as a whole 
(Koretz et al., 2001; Koretz, 2005).  
  The term coaching has been used in many ways, but we use it to mean focusing 
on incidental details of the test that are unimportant for the inference based on scores. 
These can be either aspects of format or unimportant details of content. We include under PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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coaching test-preparation strategies such as process of elimination for multiple-choice 
items. Coaching inflates scores if it leads to higher performance than one would see if 
those unimportant details were changed. For example, a study by Shepard (1988) 
illustrated how severe a failure of generalizability across formats can be. Using data from 
a state test, Shepard found that when addition items were presented in a vertical format, 
86 percent of students answered these addition questions correctly, but in horizontal 
format, only 46 percent of students did. In subtraction, the percentages were 78 and 30, 
respectively. 
  A number of studies have determined that teachers reallocate time within subjects 
in response to TBA, often at the expense of attention to important material (e.g., Koretz, 
Barron, Mitchell, & Stecher, 1996; Koretz, Mitchell, Barron, & Keith, 1996; Stecher, 
2002). In a recent RAND survey of teachers in California, Pennsylvania, and Georgia, 
teachers reported that because there were so many standards, they identified “highly 
assessed standards” on which to focus their attention (Hamilton and Stecher, 2007). 
Earlier studies by Shepard and Dougherty (1991) and Romberg, Zarinia & Williams 
(1989) found evidence of increased focus on basic skills to the exclusion of more 
complex skills in response to the emphasis placed on basic skills in state tests.  
  Studies have found a variety of forms of coaching in response to high-stakes 
testing. Studies by Darling-Hammond and Wise (1985), Shepard and Dougherty (1991), 
Smith and Rottenberg (1991), McNeil (2000), and Pedulla et al (2003) all showed that 
teachers focused their instruction not only on the content of the test, but also on its 
format, by presenting material in formats as they will appear on the test and designing 
tasks to mirror the content of the tests. PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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  While this research provides ample evidence of test preparation and other 
instructional responses that have the potential to inflate scores, the dividing line between 
inappropriate and appropriate test preparation remains unclear. Indeed, many state and 
local policies have blurred the distinction even more in recent years, e.g., by encouraging 
the use of old test forms as instructional materials and announcing “power standards” 
well in advance of testing dates. In the end, the distinction is empirical: test preparation is 
desirable if it produces valid gains in scores and undesirable if it results in inflated gains. 
Research has not yet tied variations in score inflation to specific forms of test preparation. 
Opportunities for Inflation in the Construction of a Test 
  Tests used for accountability are necessarily only a small sample of a knowledge 
domain—for example, “eighth grade mathematics”—but must support inferences about 
students’ command of the entire domain. Moreover, the tested sample is almost always 
systematically incomplete, because some types of knowledge and skills are harder to 
assess than others. Nonetheless, under low-stakes conditions, this incomplete sampling 
often works reasonably well. Because of the small sample, estimates of performance are 
subject to substantial measurement error, but this adds only imprecision, not bias. 
Because test authors create different samples from the domain, the results from different 
tests of the same domain often differ, but these differences are usually modest. 
  Using tests for accountability, however, poses a fundamental threat to the validity 
of inferences based on these tests. Even under low-stakes conditions, teachers may begin 
focusing on the specifics of the tested sample at the cost of material that is important but 
not emphasized on the test, thereby undermining the test’s representation of the larger 
domain (e.g., Lindquist, 1951). However, under low-stakes conditions, the incentives to PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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focus on the tested specifics are usually mild. In contrast, under high-stakes conditions 
like those created by test-based accountability, educators face strong incentives to focus 
instruction on the specific content and format of tested material rather than the full 
domain of knowledge and skills represented in the state standards. If these aspects of the 
test are predictable and teachers focus on them, scores will become inflated, and 
inferences about mastery of the domain will be undermined. 
  Koretz et al. (Koretz, McCaffrey, & Hamilton, 2001; Koretz & Hamilton, 2006) 
provided a formal framework for evaluating the effects of this sampling on validity under 
high-stakes conditions. They used the term performance element to denote each aspect of 
performance that affects performance on a test or is relevant to the inference the test 
scores are intended to support. An element’s test weight is the emphasis given to it by the 
test—specifically, its influence on scores—while the inference weight is the importance 
of that element to the inference based on scores. Tests will often omit elements that are 
important for the inference or assign them weights that are not proportional to the 
importance of these elements to the inference. The validity of an inference about 
improved learning is the degree to which improvement on the tested elements, as 
weighted by the particular test, accurately signals improvement in command of the entire 
domain, as weighted by the inference. Following this framework, we label standards that 
are emphasized by the test as high-weight standards and items assessing them as high-
weight items. 
  What specific opportunities do tests provide for inappropriate narrowing that can 
inflate scores? Test-preparation materials often suggest a variety of strategies, ranging 
from focusing on the standards most often emphasized by the test to taking advantage of PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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item format, for example, by using process of elimination. To examine the opportunities 
systematically, it is useful to think of the construction of a test as comprising several 
successive stages of narrowing down from the broad “target” (Kane, 2006)—the largely 
unmeasured construct about which we want to draw conclusions based on scores—to the 
specific items presented to students. Although the process of building a test need not 
always follow this sequence, the steps provide a helpful way to categorize the 
opportunities for inappropriate narrowing presented to teachers and students.  
  The first opportunity for inflation can arise in the specification of a state’s 
standards. This stage of sampling reduces a domain selected for testing, such as “eighth-
grade mathematics,” to the subset of that domain included in a given state’s content 
standards. This is represented as the step from Box 1 to Box 2 in Figure 7.1. (In each row 
of Figure 7.1, the included or emphasized material is in the left-hand box, while the 
material omitted or de-emphasized at that stage is in the shaded, right-hand box.) States 
vary in terms of both the breadth of their standards as a set and in the breadth of 
individual standards. For example, the Massachusetts standards for eighth-grade math 
include all five of the content strands represented in NAEP, while the New York 
standards omit one of the NAEP content strands—data analysis and statistics. Many of 
New York’s standards are framed very narrowly, in some cases so narrowly that they 
come close to implying specific test questions. For example, geometry standard 8G4 
requires that students, “Determine angle pair relationships when given two parallel lines 
cut by a transversal.” In contrast, most of the individual standards specified by 
Massachusetts delineate somewhat broader categories of knowledge and skills. For 
example, the Massachusetts 8
th measurement standard 8.M.3 states that students will: PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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“Demonstrate an understanding of the concepts and apply formulas and procedures for 
determining measures, including those of area and perimeter/circumference of 
parallelograms, trapezoids, and circles. Given the formulas, determine the surface area 
and volume of rectangular prisms, cylinders, and spheres. Use technology as 
appropriate.” (Note, however, that the second-to-last statement suggests a narrower 
operationalization of the standard.) Inflation that arises because educators no longer teach 
important content that is omitted from standards can only be identified by comparison to 
an external audit test that is judged to be a good measure of the relevant domain—in 
practice, most often the NAEP.  
________________ 
Figure 7.1 about here 
________________ 
  Because of limits on testing time, a second opportunity for narrowing arises: a 
given test is unlikely to sample exhaustively from the state’s standards. Moreover, even 
among standards that are sampled, some standards may be sampled much more heavily 
than others, giving performance on these heavily emphasized standards disproportionate 
impact on students’ overall scores. The selection of standards for inclusion or emphasis is 
represented by Box 3 in Figure 7.1. If this stage of sampling is unpredictable over time, it 
is unlikely to produce score inflation. For example, the students of teachers who focus 
unduly on standards emphasized in previous tests are likely to do poorly on previously 
unemphasized material included in the current-year test. Variations in test weights will 
also not inflate scores if they correspond to variations in inference weights—that is, if 
only material more important for the inference is given more emphasis by the test. PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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However, if variations in emphasis are persistent, predictable, and unjustified by the 
inference, this stage of sampling provides an opportunity for reallocation that will inflate 
scores.  
  The third stage of sampling that provides opportunities for narrowed instruction is 
the uneven sampling of skills within standards (Box 4 in Figure 7.1). Some standards are 
written broadly, such that a single standard includes mastery of a cluster of skills and 
concepts.  When a standard is written broadly, test designers sample from it in 
constructing a test, just as they sample among standards. If the within-standard sampling 
is predictable, that creates an incentive for teachers to focus on the emphasized aspects of 
the standard at the expense of those not emphasized or excluded. For example, if a given 
standard specifies that students learn rotation, transformation, and dilation of a polygon 
on a coordinate plane but only rotations are included in the test, teachers in high stakes 
contexts have an incentive to focus their instruction only on rotations. If they do, their 
students are likely to perform better on items representing that standard than they would 
on an alternative set of items representing the standard more fully. 
  The final stage of sampling, represented by Box 5 in Figure 7.1, is the choice of 
representations used to test each standard. We use the term representation to refer to both 
unimportant details of content and what we term item style. Item style is broader than 
item format, in the usual sense. For example, it includes the type of visual representation 
in the item, if any, the magnitude and complexity of the numbers used, and so on. For 
example, consider a hypothetical standard stating that students should understand the 
concept of slope in the context of simple linear equations. Problems involving slope 
could be presented verbally, graphically, or algebraically, or they could require PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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translation among those representations. If the problems are presented graphically, they 
could be presented only with positive slopes in the first quadrant, or with a mix of 
positive, negative, and zero slopes in all four quadrants. In some cases, these choices are 
similar or identical from one year to the next. In extreme cases, the chosen 
representations may be so similar over time that new items are virtual clones of earlier 
ones.  
  The use of predictable representations facilitates coaching. If tests employ similar 
or identical representations in successive years, then using prior tests to practice renders 
these items familiar and may make them easier than other items with different item styles 
that were measuring the same underlying mathematical content. In addition, the use of 
predictable representations may make it easier to develop forms of test preparation that 
allow students to correctly answer items without gaining the knowledge or skills the item 
is intended to tap. As Shepard (1988) observed, policy makers should be interested in 
whether children can add and subtract, and not in whether they can add and subtract when 
items are presented in a vertical format. 
Data and Methods 
  We examined the 2006 through 2008 eighth-grade mathematics tests in 
Massachusetts and New York and the tenth-grade mathematics test in Massachusetts. 
Both Massachusetts and New York released item maps that link each test question to a 
state standard and a strand of mathematics (e.g., number sense and operations, 
measurement, statistics and probability, algebra, and geometry). Using these item maps, 
we constructed item-level datasets that organized all released items sequentially within 
individual standards. Released items in NY include all items used on the 8
th grade math PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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test.  Released items in MA at that time includes all common items—that is, items taken 
by all students and used to generate students’ scores.  This database facilitates 
comparison of related items to identify recurrences of content or presentation that would 
afford opportunities for narrowed instruction and test preparation that might induce score 
inflation. 
  We examined recurrences largely following the schematic in Figure 7.1. We 
calculated the fraction of the strands and standards tested in each year and state, as well 
as the fraction of each area ever tested over 2006-2008. We examined the relative 
weighting of standards on the state exams both within and across years. To address 
differences in the narrowness of individual standards, we mapped the eighth-grade 
standards in New York onto those in Massachusetts and evaluated the breadth of the New 
York tests in terms of Massachusetts’ broader standards. We isolated clusters of 
extremely similar items on each test in the years 2006-2008, and mapped backwards to 
the standards to identify cases where similar items were used to sample nominally 
different standards.  
  Because some standards, particularly in Massachusetts, represent broader bundles 
of skills and knowledge, we explored how well the tests evenly sample skills represented 
within a given standard. For example, a standard might require students to master tax, 
percent increase/decrease, simple interest, and sale prices, but consistently ask questions 
about interest rather than sale prices. 
  We examined the sequence of items within each standard in all of the tests to 
identify recurrences of representations. In theory, these recurrences can entail either 
aspects of item style or unimportant details of content—that is, details that are not PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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warranted by the inference based on scores. However, in practice, the distinction between 
these two aspects of representation is often unclear, and we found that we could not 
reliably code it. Therefore, we do not make this distinction in the presentation of results. 
Results 
  We present results here in the order presented in Figure 7.1. 
Elements from the domain included in the standards (Box 2 in Figure 7.1) 
  Narrowing from the domain to the standards occurs in the selection of content for 
inclusion in the standards, the wording of the standards, and the operationalization of the 
standards in the test. To quantify the degree of narrowing between the larger domain in 
an area such as “eighth grade mathematics” and the domain described in a given state’s 
standards, we would need a formal definition of what constitutes the larger domain, and 
in the U.S., agreement about the domain is, at best, incomplete. Nonetheless, we can 
illustrate the process by comparing state standards to the framework of standards of the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress, which is intended to reflect a degree of 
national consensus about what students should know and be able to do. We can also 
compare the standards of the two states to compare the breadth, depth and complexity of 
skills and understandings they describe.
1 A comparison of eighth-grade standards from 
the two states provides striking examples of this stage of narrowing. In several respects, 
New York’s standards and tests were markedly narrower than those of Massachusetts, 
and the details of that comparison offer concrete illustrations of the ways in which this 
narrowing can occur. 
  We have already an obvious instance of narrowing: the New York State eighth-
grade mathematics standards entirely omitted the data analysis, statistics, and probability PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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strand included in the NAEP, although the state’s seventh-grade standards did include 
this strand. In contrast, the eighth-grade Massachusetts standards included five strands 
similar to those in the NAEP framework. Mapping from state standards to NAEP 
standards is inherently ambiguous because the two sets of standards divide content 
differently, and often there is a limited degree of overlap between two seemingly 
different standards. Nonetheless, it is clear that the New York standards were also 
somewhat narrower than the NAEP standards in the four strands they have in common. 
For example, the eighth-grade NAEP standards “Estimate square or cube roots of 
numbers less than 1,000 between two whole numbers” and “Visualize or describe the 
cross section of a solid” were not present in the New York eighth-grade standards. 
  A simple count of standards would suggest that New York’s standards are broader 
than those of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Mathematics Curriculum Framework 
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2000) lists 39 eighth-grade content standards 
spanning five strands. New York State’s Mathematics Core Curriculum (New York State 
Education Department, 2005) lists 48 eighth-grade content standards, even though this 
document excludes the data analysis, statistics, and probability strand.  
  More detailed examination, however, shows that the reverse is true: New York 
samples more narrowly from the domain. One reason is the wording of New York’s 
standards, many of which were very narrowly worded, some so much so that they 
encompassed only one or a few pieces of information. For example, standard 8.G.1 was 
simply “Identify pairs of vertical angles as congruent.” Moreover, this standard was just a 
subset of another, slightly less narrow standard, 8.G.6: “Calculate the missing angle PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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measurements when given two intersecting lines and an angle” (New York State 
Education Department, 2005, p. 86). 
  In contrast, the Massachusetts standards were typically much broader. For 
example, Massachusetts standard 8.G.6 was “Predict the results of transformations on 
unmarked or coordinate planes and draw the transformed figure, e.g., predict how 
tessellations transform under translations, reflections, and rotations” (Massachusetts 
Department of Education, 2000, p. 64). This single Massachusetts standard encompasses 
fully six separate New York standards that are grouped under the heading “Students will 
apply coordinate geometry to analyze problem solving situations:” 
•  8.G.7 “Describe and identify transformations in the plane, using proper 
function notation (rotations, reflections, translations, and dilations)” 
•  8.G.8 “Draw the image of a figure under rotations of 90 and 180 degrees” 
•  8.G.9 “Draw the image of a figure under a reflection over a given line” 
•  8.G.10 “Draw the image of a figure under a translation” 
•  8.G.11 “Draw the image of a figure under a dilation” 
•  8.G.12 “Identify the properties preserved and not preserved under a reflection, 
rotation, translation, and dilation” (New York State Education Department, 
2005, p. 86).  
While not all cases were this extreme, we found that in general, the Massachusetts 
standards were broader, so the small number of standards in Massachusetts actually 
sampled more broadly from the domain than did the more numerous New York 
standards.  PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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  This difference in the breadth of standards was reflected in the allocation of items 
and raw score points on the tests in the two states. As detailed further below, we found 
that 40 to 50 percent of the raw score points on the New York eighth-grade tests in any 
given year mapped to only three Massachusetts eighth-grade standards.  
  The wording of standards may narrow content in subtle ways. For example, the 
Massachusetts standards include calculation of the volume of rectangular prisms but 
specify that the student will be given the formula: 
10.M.2 Given the formula, find the lateral area, surface area, and volume 
of prisms, pyramids, spheres, cylinders, and cones, e.g., find the volume of 
a sphere with a specified surface area (Massachusetts Department of 
Education, 2000, p. 75, emphasis added]. 
Including the italicized clause fundamentally narrows what is being measured. The 
student does not need to know the mathematical relationship between volume and 
dimensions to solve items addressing this standard; she needs only the elementary-school 
skills of “plugging” numbers into an equation and multiplying. Figure 7.2 shows a tenth-
grade MCAS item assessing this standard, along with an item assessing similar content 
from Singapore’s Primary School Leaving Examination, which students take at the end of 
sixth grade. Because the formula is given in the tenth-grade MCAS (it is not shown in 
Figure 7.2 because it is not contiguous in the test booklet), one could discard any mention 
of volume or the particular shape and simply ask students to solve the equation. By way 
of contrast, sixth-graders in Singapore are not given the formula and are expected to 
know the mathematical relationship between dimensions and volume. PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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_____________________ 
Insert Figure 7.2 about here 
_____________________ 
  A simple listing of standards may understate the narrowing that can occur at this 
stage. The tests also create operational definitions of the standards, which may further 
narrow sampling from the domain. For example, items may predictably omit aspects of a 
standard that may be more difficult. The items in Figure 7.2 provide an example of this. 
The Massachusetts item (and the corresponding items in the New York tests, which are 
found in grade 6) require either calculating the total volume of a single prism or 
calculating one dimension given a full prism. In contrast, the Singapore item in Figure 
7.2 requires comparison of two prisms and calculation of a fractional volume. 
  Although narrowing within standards in the writing of test items is discussed 
below, it is important to note here that the content of items may further narrow the span 
of the standards when items that purportedly measure two standards are so similar that 
they are effectively sampling the same content. For example, Figure 7.3 shows very 
similar items used to assess tenth-grade Massachusetts standards D.2 and P.2. These are 
not only different standards; they are also drawn from two different strands (Data 
Analysis and Interpretation, and Patterns and Algebra, respectively). Similar items 
assessing nominally different standards are found in the New York tests as well.  
_________________________ 
Insert Figure 7.3 about here 
_________________________ PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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Selection of a subset of the standards (Box 3 in Figure 7.1) 
  Tests may create incentives for teachers to narrow instruction by omitting certain 
standards, providing the opportunity for teachers to exclude or deemphasize content 
without negatively affecting students’ test scores. Table 7.1 shows that over the years 
2006-2008, an average of 42 percent of New York eighth-grade standards, 67 percent of 
Massachusetts eighth-grade standards, and 60 percent of Massachusetts tenth-grade 
standards were tested.
2 That only a fraction of the state curriculum is tested in any given 
year would not enable score inflation so long as different standards are tested each year 
and teachers cannot predict which standards will be tested. For example, if the tests were 
based on a random sample of the standards each year, there would be no incentive for 
teachers to focus on a limited fraction of the curriculum.  
  Therefore, to assess whether sampling of standards was predictably incomplete, 
we examined the percentage of standards tested over the three-year period of the study, 
2006-2008. Over this three-year period, 58 percent of relevant standards were sampled on 
the New York eighth-grade test, 83 percent were sampled on the Massachusetts tenth-
grade test, and 90 percent were sampled by the Massachusetts eighth-grade test.  All three 
tests created opportunities for reallocation by omitting content, although to varying 
degrees. However, these simple counts understate opportunities for inflation because they 
do not consider the relative emphasis the tests assign to the tested standards. If variations 
in emphasis—that is, test weights—are predictable, scores may become inflated if 
teachers emphasize highly sampled content, while decreasing emphasis on standards that 
are never (or only infrequently) sampled. Therefore, it is important to examine test 
weights in addition to omissions. PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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  In both states, a small number of standards accounted for the majority of test 
points on the state tests. Figure 7.4 compares the distribution of standard weights on the 
three exams.  The x-axis reports the number of standards ever actually assessed in the 
exams, sorted from the most to the least highly assessed. The y-axis indicates the 
percentage of points each standard is worth. The area below the step functions, therefore, 
corresponds to the percentage of test points covered by the number of standards at any 
point along the x-axis. The dotted drop lines indicate how many standards students must 
master to earn 50% of test points. On the New York eighth-grade test, about 50 percent of 
possible test points corresponded to only 10 of 48 standards. Similarly, on the 
Massachusetts eighth-grade math test, 8 of 29 standards account for a little more than 50 
percent of test points, and on the tenth-grade test, 5 of thirty standards corresponded to 
about 50 percent of test points. The patterns are particularly stark for the Massachusetts 
tenth-grade mathematics tests, where the single standard with the highest test weight 
consistently contributed between 15 and 17 percent of test points per year, while the 
second highest weight standard consistently contributed between 7 and 17 percent of test 
points. To the extent that these weights represent consistent patterns of emphasis, 
teachers could profitably identify and teach to the cluster of standards that drives the 
highest number of test points, sacrificing instruction focusing on the others. 
  However, the extent of narrowing depends not just on the number of standards 
tested, but also on their breadth. As noted, the New York standards are generally 
narrower than those of Massachusetts, and a comparison between them should take this 
into account. To illustrate this point, Figure 7.5 represents the distribution of standards 
tested over 2006-2008 once the New York eighth-grade standards have been mapped PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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onto those in Massachusetts. Here, we see that the uneven sampling of standards is much 
more dramatic on New York’s eighth-grade test than on Massachusetts’s; just 4 
Massachusetts standards make up 50 percent of test points on the New York eighth-grade 
tests.  
Coaching to high frequency items requires that teachers or students recognize the 
predicable patterns in the test. This is made easier when states release items that are 
similar to those that will be used in the future. In the period we studied, teachers in both 
states could download entire released forms that contain all the items used to calculate 
students’ scores.
3  Moreover, in Massachusetts, teachers could download all the items in 
past years associated with a given standard. This type of sorting makes it easier for 
administrators and teachers to isolate aspects of their curriculum that are actually tested, 
as well as how and with what frequency performance on each standard is measured.  
_________________________ 
Insert Figures 7.4 & 7.5 about here 
 _________________________ 
 
Selecting from within standards (Box 4 in Figure 7.1) 
  The previous section showed that standards are often unevenly sampled on state 
tests. When standards are framed broadly, tests may further narrow the sample by 
consistently excluding some skills from within a standard. This is more of a potential 
concern in Massachusetts than in New York because of the wording of standards. Many 
of New York’s standards are written very narrowly, causing a narrowing of focus at the 
level of Box 3 and leaving less room for further narrowing at the level of Box 4. In 
contrast, most Massachusetts standards are written to include a cluster of skills, concepts, PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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and representations, which creates a risk of score inflation if tests do not adequately 
sample from the skill set implied by the standards.   
  To evaluate how large a problem this was in Massachusetts, we examined items 
testing standards that contributed an average of 3 percent or more of test points per year 
in the years 2006-2008. We chose a 3 percent threshold because this represents sufficient 
weight to have a substantial effect on students’ overall scores. We compared the test 
items to the specific standards they sampled, and noted which particular aspects of the 
standard the items sampled. (We did find a small number of examples of similar 
omissions on the New York tests even though the narrow framing of most standards 
made within-standard sampling less likely.) 
We found evidence of incomplete sampling within standards on both the eighth-
and tenth-grade Massachusetts tests. Four of the seven standards high-weight standards 
were incompletely sampled on the eighth-grade test. On the tenth-grade test, three of the 
six high-weight standards were incompletely sampled.  
For example, eighth-grade standard 8.N.3 required students to “Use ratios and 
proportions in the solution of problems, in particular, problems solving unit rates, scale 
factors, and rate of change.” Over this period, students were never asked to solve 
problems using the rate of change. In other cases, certain operations were excluded. 
Standard 8.N.12. requires students to “Select and use appropriate operations—addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, division, and positive integer exponents—to solve problems 
with rational numbers (including negatives),” but multiplication and positive integer 
exponents were never tested. In some cases, omission of a portion of a standard from 
items explicitly linked to that standard may not be problematic because of other items on PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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the test. For example, the tenth-grade standard 10.D.1 required students to, “Select, 
create, and interpret as appropriate (e.g. scatterplot, table, stem-and-leaf plots, box-and-
whisker plots, circle graph, line graph, and line plot) for a set of data….”  The items 
linked to this standard omitted scatterplots, line graphs, and selection of appropriate 
representations, but these were sampled in the context of other items addressing other 
standards.  
Selecting representations (Box 5 in Figure 7.1) 
  All of the previous steps entail narrowing of what is tested on state tests, relative 
to the domain about which inferences based on test scores are made. The final stage, the 
selection of representations, entails how that content is tested. As noted, we use the term 
representation broadly to refer not just to item format and the appearance of material in 
the test item, but also to the recurrent use of minor details of content that are incidental to 
the construct the item is intended to assess. 
  In extreme cases, representations are so similar that items are essentially clones of 
those used in earlier years. A particularly extreme example of clone items was found in 
the seventh-grade mathematics tests in New York. Two of the four items that appeared 
over a four-year period are shown in Figure 7.6. Note that the stems are essentially 
identical except for the substitution of “watermelon” for “cheese,” and the distracters are 
similar except for the doubling of rulers in the second year. One of the remaining two 
items was also a clone of these two. The fourth was similar but more complex, requiring 
students to recognize that the appropriate measure is grams rather than kilograms. 
  A more subtle form of recurrent presentation can be seen in the items testing New 
York standard 8.N.4, “Apply percents to: tax, percent increase/decrease, simple interest, PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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sale price, commission, interest rates, gratuities.” This was one of the two most 
frequently tested standards in the eighth-grade tests, tested with 12 items during the four 
years from 2006 through 2010. Of those 12 items, only one required students to calculate 
a rate or percentage. The other 11 provided a base quantity and a percentage and required 
that the student calculate either a change (e.g., a discount or a tip) or a final quantity (e.g., 
a total bill including the tip). The use of a consistent form narrows what students need to 
know and facilitates teaching mechanical solutions that do not require a solid 
understanding of rates or percentages. 
Discussion 
This study documents that the tests in New York and Massachusetts– and in 
particular, the New York eighth-grade and Massachusetts tenth-grade tests—do provide 
opportunities for narrow test preparation that could lead to inflated scores. We found 
multiple similarities in the types of opportunities afforded by both tests. Predictable 
sampling of standards and predictable representations of skills, were present on all tests, 
though their severity varied. We also identified test-specific opportunities that derived 
from the way the standards are framed in each state.   
Substantial resources have been devoted to identifying these patterns—by state 
agencies, districts, and commercial firms—and anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
teachers are aware of them. For example, the Quincy, Massachusetts district website lists 
the test weights of each section of secondary mathematics textbooks used in the district 
and shows all of the relevant test items from a four year period (Quincy Public Schools, 
2004). In an interview with the first author, a data coach in the Boston Public Schools 
provided pie charts illustrating the proportion of the total possible points on the test that PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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could be attributed to each standard, which was used to decide what to emphasize in the 
classroom. As another data coach in the Boston Public Schools told us, “(The attitude is) 
just focus on the questions and content with the most potential to drive up scores. Why 
teach anything else?” In other cases, commercial test preparation resources alert teachers 
to recurrent patterns.  
These predictable patterns in tests used for accountability create incentives to 
narrow instruction in ways that can deprive students of good instruction, disadvantage 
good teachers and inflate scores. When teachers, administrators and schools are evaluated 
based the gains their students demonstrate on these tests, they face strong disincentives to 
provide students with opportunities to master the full breadth and depth of math learning 
described in each state’s framework of standards. Thus, tests that provide substantial 
opportunities for score inflation increase the likelihood that performance evaluation 
systems based on test score gains will misidentify successful teachers and schools and 
perversely reward teachers who teach to the test, while penalizing teachers who attempt 
to instruct students in the entire domain outlined in state standards. As Shepard (1990) 
notes, schools or teachers that teach to the full framework of a curriculum and thus 
provide a broad, rich curriculum beyond the specifics of the tested sample might be at a 
disadvantage on a test used for accountability purposes. Because these teachers seek to 
provide students with a broader educational experience, they spend proportionally less 
time on the specific content that offers the greatest return in terms of test score gains.   
This study provides only a first glimpse of the opportunities for inappropriate test 
preparation provided by current high-stakes tests. Ample research, however, shows that 
the results—inappropriate instruction and score inflation—are widespread and often PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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severe. Improving test-based accountability will require more widespread evaluation of 
these opportunities, monitoring educators’ responses, and redesigning of tests and the 
accountability systems in which these tests are embedded to reduce incentives to narrow 
instruction, 
We close by pointing towards important areas for future research on equity, which 
is the focus of this book. What remains incompletely researched is whether historically 
disadvantaged groups are more likely to receive test-specific instruction, and to what 
extent score inflation affects the measurement of between-group inequality in outcomes. 
To the extent that poor and minority students are concentrated in the lowest-scoring 
schools that face the greatest pressure to raise scores, they may be the most severely 
affected (e.g., Rouse et al., 2007). Nonetheless, many policymakers and educators 
continue to view test score data as accurate measurements that track student performance 
as well as racial and socioeconomic inequities. While test scores are intended to provide 
more transparency about student performance, this chapter demonstrates the ways that 
predictability in test design supports test-specific instruction.  Any score inflation caused 
by test-specific instruction interferes with our ability to accurately measure educational 
inequality.PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Taxonomy of Opportunities for Score Inflation. 
 
  NOTE: “tested” vs. “untested” also represents emphasized vs. de-emphasized. 
   
1. Domain selected for testing (math, ELA, etc.) 
2. Selecting elements from domain for 
inclusion in standards 
Elements from domain omitted 
from standards 
3. Selecting subset of standards for testing 
or emphasis 
Untested subset of standards 
4. Selecting material from within tested 
standards for testing or emphasis 
Untested material from within 
tested standards 
 
5. Selecting representations for tested 
material 
Untested representations PREPUBLICATION DRAFT 
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a. 10
th-grade MCAS (March retest), 2010: formula provided 
 
b. 6
th-grade Singapore Primary School Leaving Exam: no formula given 
 
                                                                                     Answer ________________ 
_ 
 
Figure 7.2.  Comparison of volume items from 10
th-grade MCAS and Singapore 6
th-
grade tests.  Sample MCAS retrieved from MA Department of Education’s MCAS 
Question Search (2011).  http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/search/   Sample Singapore item 
is from Singapore Examinations and Assessment Board (2009). 
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D.2 (Data Analysis and Interpretation)
 
P.2 (Patterns and Algebra)
 
 
Figure 7.3. Similar 10th-grade MCAS items used to sample nominally different 
standards. Item #35 on MCAS 10th-grade test in 2005 assesses standard D.2 by having 
students determine the equation from a linear scatterplot. Item #13 on MCAS 10th-grade 
test in 2006 assesses standard P.2 by having students determine the equation from a line. 
Retrieved from MA Department of Education’s MCAS Question Search (2008). 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/search/ 
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Figure 7.4. Distribution of standards tested on NY and MA Mathematics Tests 
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Figure 7.5. Distribution of Standards Tested on NY and MA 8
th-Grade Mathematics Tests (NY 
standards mapped to MA standards) 
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a) Item 27 in 2008 
 
 
Item 9 in 2009 
 
 
Figure 7.6.  Clone items assessing NY’s standard 7.M.9: “Determine the tool and technique to 
measure with an appropriate level of precision: mass.”  (New York State Department of 
Education, 2008, p.21 and 2009, p.11).  
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Tables 
 
Table 7.1.   Fraction of Total NY and MA Standards Tested by Year and Over 2006-2008 
Set of Standards 
 
Average  
per year 
 
Ever, 2006-
2008  
 
 
New York eighth-grade standards 
 
42 
 
58 
 
Massachusetts eighth-grade standards  67  90 
 
Massachusetts tenth-grade standards 
 
60  83 
Note. Number of standards tested in parentheses. MA excludes out of grade standards that are 
sampled on the test, because these are extraneous to the validity of inferences about student 
mastery of the standards in the tests’ corresponding grade level framework.  
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Notes: 
                                                 
1 A majority of states have committed to adopting the Common Core Standards, and this could provide a more 
widely accepted operational definition of the target of inference. However, Porter et al. (2011) reported that 
alignment between the Common Core and NAEP is only modest, albeit a bit higher than the average alignment 
between the Common Core and the average state’s standards. The disparity between NAEP and the Common Core 
is not yet widely understood, and it remains unclear whether educators, policymakers, and others will decide that 
NAEP content omitted from the Common Core is relevant to the domain. 
 
2 Because the New York state math test was administered in March during this time period, New York identified a 
subset of standards that were eligible for inclusion in the state test. These standards included seventh-grade 
standards scheduled to be taught after March of the previous year, as well as eighth-grade standards taught before 
March. All told, 68.8 percent of the eighth-grade standards are eligible for testing. In addition, the eighth-grade test 
includes standards taught in the seventh-grade curriculum after the March test. To provide comparability across 
states, we focus on the percent of the total 8th standards that were tested each year. Were we to use a denominator 
that includes seventh-grade post-March standards and eighth-grade pre-March standards, 83 percent of standards 
were covered between 2006-2008. 
 
3 Beginning in 2011, New York stopped releasing test forms. In most grades and subjects, Massachusetts began 
releasing only half of the common items in 2009. 